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I. Introduction
{1} The explosive growth in the number of people communicating from computers around the world via the
Internet ("Net") has led to the proliferation of another type of speech, namely, scholarly articles on virtually
every aspect of the Net and its many influences on life in America. One topic that has received a great deal of
attention is the extent to which laws applicable within the geographical territory of the United States may be
applied to the freewheeling world of Cyberspace, which knows virtually no geographical limitations. Many
commentators in the United States have followed one of two streams of argument: either they have restricted
their analyses to the ways in which existing U.S. law should or will affect the rights and responsibilities of
Net users within the United States,[1]or they have argued that no country's laws should apply to Cyberspace.
The former group ignores the essentially international nature of the Net and overlooks the fact that regulation
of the Net likely will happen at least in part at the international level. The latter group unrealistically claims
that Cyberspace should be viewed by countries around the world as a new, separate jurisdiction with both the
right and the ability to govern itself. These Cyber-activists overlook the fact that virtually no country in the
world is likely to agree to this approach, as it would require them to cede a degree of sovereignty to a
nebulous group of self-appointed self-regulators.
{2} In this paper, I will discuss two of the arguments most commonly put forth in support of Cyber-
independence; namely, that it is technologically impossible to filter out illegal or objectionable content on a
country-to-country basis, and that the Net, as the world's most open and progressive democratic discourse,
represents a thoroughly positive force that should not be hemmed in by governmental regulation. As to the
first argument, I will discuss briefly some existing filtering technologies and their potential to effectively
restrict illegal content. Then, I will give an overview of scholarly opinion and some recent U.S. court rulings
on an issue that is certain to be of central importance to any future regulation of the Net, namely, what types
of electronic contacts must a Net user have to a given forum before that forum can constitutionally exercise
personal jurisdiction over the user? Finally, I will dedicate most of this paper to a refutation of the second
argument, which I believe is false for the following reason: the argument assumes that an unfettered discourse
should or will be viewed by most countries as a more democratic process than a restricted forum. I believe
this assumption is disproved by the fact that every democratic country has a different assortment of
restrictions on the right to freedom of speech. This indicates that the unique limitations on free speech
actually may be the basis of a given country's democratic discourse, as they reveal that country's fundamental
societal values and conception of the role of free speech within its political system.
{3} In support of this contention, I will discuss a basic difference between free speech laws in the United
States and the Federal Republic of Germany, namely, the treatment of offensive and anti-Semitic speech. This
discussion will demonstrate that free speech regimes vary in quite real ways, even among Western
democracies, and that these differences are anything but random. Rather, they are based upon each country's
unique history and its conception of the best way to foster a democratic discourse. This example will
illustrate the idea that many democratic countries do not believe that restrictions on public speech harm
democratic discourse; on the contrary, they often believe that such restrictions are necessary to foster such
discourse. Given this fact, I believe most countries will be exceedingly resistant to any homogenizing force
that would threaten to eliminate the unique aspects of their free speech regimes. The Net, in its current,
largely unregulated state, is just such a homogenizing force, and it is inevitable that countries around the
world will attempt to apply their existing free speech standards to Net-speech through national and
international, legislative, and political initiatives. Indeed, this idea finds clear support in the vast array of
regulatory efforts currently underway around the world. I will discuss some of these efforts on the
prosecutorial, legislative and diplomatic levels in Germany and the European Union in order to demonstrate
the strong desire of these governments to subject the Net to regulation.
{4} Based upon my belief that Net regulation is inevitable, I will argue that Cyber-advocates are committing
a serious strategic error by concentrating a great deal of their collective energy on the ill-fated campaign for
Cyber-independence. They would be much better advised to take an active role in the nascent regulatory
process in order to ensure the enactment of the most effective and least restrictive regulatory scheme. These
Net-users are not only the most knowledgeable members of their given societies about the Net, but also the
ones who will feel the effects of regulation most acutely. Therefore, it is in their interests to put aside their
often contemptuous attitudes toward legislators and join in guiding the regulatory process. This should be
done by advising governments on the positive value of the Net for democratic processes. It should also
involve cooperating in the continued development of appropriate laws and of such technologies as content
filters and labeling systems in order to minimize the restrictions placed on Net speech.
II. Filtering the Net -- Possibilities and Limitations of Current Technology
{5} As mentioned above, many opponents of governmental regulation of the Net insist that any attempt to
enforce laws on the Net through technological means is destined to fail. They claim that the Net is simply too
flexible, decentralized, and multifaceted to be harnessed by filters or the like.[2] This position fits well with
the popular image of the Net as a place without limits, a massive, multi-headed beast that will find a way
around any barrier placed in its path.[3] But that image might not be completely accurate. While the
effectiveness of filtering technology remains unproven, significant progress appears to have been made in the
development of effective filtering systems in the past two years.
{6} Two potentially important tools that have been developed are a widely accepted standard for labeling Net
documents based on their content and a hardware device that ostensibly would allow local, regional, or
national officials to control what content is available to users in their domain.[4] PICS, the Platform for
Internet Content Selection, was developed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's World Wide Web
Consortium, an industry working group, to establish conventions for label formats and distribution methods.
[5] The PICS conventions do not specify who should label sites nor the criteria for such labeling; rather, they
simply provide consistent standards to allow both first-party and third-party labeling.[6] The conventions
have been accepted by a wide range of industry players, including Microsoft, IBM, Netscape, and SurfWatch,
and access providers, including AOL, CompuServe and Prodigy, have promised to develop PICS-compliant
blocking software.[7] Although the PICS conventions are not a filtering tool in themselves, they should make
it easier for governments, parents, or employers to implement more finely tailored content limitations, in
effect making filtering software more accurate.[8] The accuracy of filters will be extremely important to
Cyber-discourse, as less accurate filters are bound to restrict more speech than intended, causing a "spillover"
effect on speech that is legal but for some reason looks to the filters identical to illicit speech.[9] The
hardware device mentioned above would function on the basis of a labeling system such as PICS and could
be fine-tuned to implement content restrictions nationwide, community-wide, or even down to the individual
Net user.[10] This machine is an Internet switching device that would be housed at the site of the access
provider, which means that it could apply content restrictions to all or some of the customers served via that
site.[11] While the device sounds promising, it can be very expensive, and it might be prone to
circumvention, as users wishing to avoid restrictions enforced by all service providers in a given country or
locality probably could use a foreign provider to gain unlimited access to the Net.[12] Despite the possibility
of circumvention, this device and the considerable amount of research that is being devoted to such
technologies indicate that a technological means of restricting Net content to fit a country's physical borders
might exist in the near future. In any event, the summary dismissal of such technologies by certain Cyber-
advocates is clearly premature.[13]
III. The Campaign for Cyber-Independence
{7} The chorus of voices calling for the recognition of Cyberspace as a new, separate jurisdiction beyond the
bailiwick of any existing government cites a variety of arguments in support of Cyber-independence. Many
Cyber-advocates argue that the Net represents a vast democratic forum in which the right to freedom of
speech trumps all governments' rights to regulate it, even turning the U.S. Supreme Court's own language
against the government and arguing that the solution for objectionable speech on the Net is "more speech."
[14] Others contend that the charm of the Net's unique communicative possibilities would be lost if
governments were to regulate content.[15] Still others claim that Cyberspace actually is a separate place and
cannot be tied to any geographic locations, emphasizing that the borders of Cyberspace are defined by
passwords and screens and that users are not passive recipients of content but "active travelers."[16] Finally,
several commentators have questioned the propriety of governments' imposing speech restrictions on the Net,
arguing that a given state's assertion of personal jurisdiction over a Net user based solely upon the user's
electronic contacts to the state is dubious at best.[17]
{8} I first will address the jurisdictional issue, as I believe it presents the most credible objection to enforcing
existing laws against Net users. Then, I will devote the remainder of this paper to a refutation of the argument
that many Cyber-activists appear to believe provides the strongest support for Cyber-independence, namely,
that the Net should be protected in its current state, as it represents the most uninhibited, and therefore most
democratic, forum in the world for the discussion of virtually any issue imaginable.
A. Exactly Where is Cyberspace? -- The Problem of Jurisdiction Based on Electronic Contacts
{9} Numerous commentators have analyzed the legal problem presented when a court attempts to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant whose sole contacts to the forum are electronic.[18] The issue can be
framed as follows: can a person who sends data via the Internet properly be forced to defend herself in court
in any forum in which the data can be accessed on the Net?[19] Under U.S. law, the question is whether the
mere availability of the sender's transmission in a given forum constitutes the requisite minimum contacts so
as to give courts in that forum personal jurisdiction over her.[20] If not, what further contacts are required in
order to meet due process requirements? This issue becomes more complicated when the defendant is neither
a U.S. citizen nor physically present in the United States, as the problem of extraterritorial application of laws
and the question of infringement on national sovereignty arise.
{10}In general, commentators seem to agree that personal jurisdiction cannot or should not be asserted over a
defendant based solely on the availability of a defendant's Internet transmissions in a given forum.[21]
Arguments against personal jurisdiction in such cases tend to be based upon the notion that such an exercise
of jurisdiction would be inconsistent with the due process considerations that govern the law of personal
jurisdiction.[22] Dan L. Burk, for example, argues:
online contacts or transactions by themselves will frequently, if not routinely, fail to support an
assertion of jurisdiction over the person engaging in the activity. The argument that a cybernaut
exposes herself to lawsuits in any and every jurisdiction that her packets may reach is an
argument unsupported by either doctrine or policy.[23]
William S. Byassee concludes that new jurisdictional and venue rules are needed in the context of
Cyberspace, as "[t]raditional legal paradigms do not fit this [online] interaction because they treat the
interaction as occurring entirely in the real world locations in which the participants reside."[24] Cynthia L.
Counts and C. Amanda Martin, meanwhile, contend that online contacts to a forum state in the libel context
often would not support personal jurisdiction in that state, as the due process requirements of minimum
contacts and avoiding offense to "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" might not be met.
[25] Counts and Martin assert that personal jurisdiction in the Internet context must be limited to those Net
users who purposefully direct their communications to the forum in question.[26] Given the fact that
messages sent over the Net often are not purposefully directed to any geographic location in particular, this
rule apparently would mean that personal jurisdiction would lie only in the case of such directed
transmissions as e-mail or commercial web sites that require users to register before accessing the sites. This
stance has been adopted by a few courts, while other courts have gone beyond the limitation proposed by
Counts and Martin.
{11} The crude contours of the law of personal jurisdiction in the Internet context gradually are becoming
recognizable, albeit by way of a motley collection of federal and state court decisions reached without any
significant guidance from the Supreme Court.
{12} The following principles have been recognized:  
{13} 1. Personal jurisdiction does lie if a defendant makes data available in a given forum via the Net and if
she knows that people within that forum actually are accessing the data (for example, if the sender requires
other users to register and through the registration process discovers the users' locations).[27] In Minnesota v.
Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., a Minnesota state court held that it had personal jurisdiction over the defendant, a
Nevada corporation that was running a gambling service over the Internet, whereby users could register with
the defendant, pay a fee and deposit a requisite amount of money in an account, and then place bets through
the defendant's service. The Minnesota Attorney General sought injunctive and declaratory relief, seeking an
order barring the defendant from sending electronic advertisements to the state or requiring the defendant to
state in the ads that the service is void in Minnesota (because it is illegal under state law). The Court held that
the defendant did have the requisite minimum contacts to the state, as it knew that Minnesota Net users were
accessing the site and using the service. The Court stated, in a bit of an exaggeration, that the defendant had
made a direct marketing campaign to Minnesota, and that it was, therefore, reasonable to require the
defendant to defend itself in a court in that state.
{14} This ruling is supplemented by a public announcement issued via the Internet by the Minnesota
Attorney General, which was entitled a "warning to all Internet users and providers."[28] This document
asserts that "persons outside of Minnesota who transmit information via the Internet knowing that
information will be disseminated in Minnesota are subject to jurisdiction in Minnesota courts for violations of
state criminal and civil laws."[29] This broad assertion of jurisdiction appears to include every single Net
transmission that is not specifically limited to a particular recipient (such as e-mail), as Net users around the
world certainly know that their web sites, homepages and contributions to chat rooms, bulletin boards and the
like are potentially accessible by every user with a Net connection, including those in Minnesota. The
statement would be slightly amusing in its boldness and overreach, if it were not accompanied by the attorney
general's successful suit against Granite Gate Resorts, which indicates that the state fully intends to
implement this policy. Needless to say, if every state and country assumed this broad jurisdictional right, Net
users would be under constant threat of prosecution for violating laws of which they might never have heard.
This case reaffirms the need for a clarification of the jurisdictional issue, not only among nations but also
among the 50 States.[30]
{15} 2. In some circumstances, personal jurisdiction may be exercised by a court in a forum to which the
defendant's only contacts are the unrestricted availability of his website in that forum.
{16} In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry [31], the defendant, a resident of Italy, had established a
web site on a server in Italy bearing the name "Playmen" featuring sexually explicit photographs of women.
Fifteen years earlier, the same court had issued a permanent injunction against the defendant from using the
same name "Playmen" in the title or subtitle of a magazine published, distributed, or sold in the United
States.[32] The website had a less explicit part that could be accessed without the defendant's knowledge and
a more explicit part that required payment of a fee and registration of the user with the defendant. The
defendant argued that although the site could be accessed via the Net in the United States, he was not actively
selling or distributing his products here because users had to "come to Italy" to access the photos. Thus, he
argued, his act of posting images on a server in Italy could not be viewed as selling or distributing those
images in the United States.
{17} The Court disagreed with the defendant, holding that the defendant had actively sought out customers in
the United States for both parts of his site. Customers had to register with him and receive a password, so the
defendant had reason to know that some users were located in the United States. The Court admitted that it
did not have the power to order the defendant to close down his site, because both the defendant and the
server are located in Italy and stated that an attempt to do so merely because the site was illegal in the United
States would be "tantamount to a declaration that this Court, and every other court throughout the world, may
assert jurisdiction over all information providers on the global World Wide Web."[33] The Court ordered,
however, that the defendant must refrain from accepting customers from the United States. The defendant
pointed out that the less explicit part of his site was available without a password, and therefore did not
require any contact between users and the defendant. Therefore, he had no notice of users' locations.[34]
Despite this, the Federal Court held that even that part of the site violated the injunction, because the less
explicit part of the site contained many of the same images as and was intended as an advertisement for the
more explicit part. Therefore, the Court ordered that the defendant must either shut down the site completely
or prevent U.S. users from accessing it. The Court suggested that passwords be required for both parts of the
site and that, if technology is incapable of identifying where users who request passwords reside, the
defendant should require all password requests to be sent by regular mail.
{18} The Court's holding in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry represent a tremendous, and quite
dubious, assertion of authority by the Court. These rulings effectively require an Italian content provider to
either shut down his site to the entire world or to force all potential customers from around the world to send
their password requests by regular mail. The holdings present two very difficult questions. First, how does the
Court intend to enforce its orders if the defendant simply ignores them? Second, would the Court expect an
American content provider who transmits data that is fully legal under U.S. law to comply with a similarly
intrusive ruling from a court in Rome or Tehran? If anything, the Court's rulings illustrate the exceedingly
complex problem presented by the Internet. Despite the Court's language to the contrary, its decisions do
reflect the horrifying idea that any court anywhere could assert jurisdiction over any content provider
anywhere in the world. This problem is moderated somewhat by the unlikelihood that courts around the
world actually could enforce their judgments. However, one wonders whether a decision like Playboy
Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry creates a dangerous precedent. Will the next Satanic Verses,[35] for
example, be published by an American author via the Net, leading to a death sentence on the author by a
government that feels deeply blighted by the work? Is it sensible to rely on the idea that we are beyond the
reach of a government that would issue such a sentence, considering that the U.S. government itself has
resorted to brutality and kidnapping in order to bring a wanted suspect before an American court? [36]
{19} 3. Personal jurisdiction does lie if a Net user repeatedly sends data to a server in a given forum,
knowing that the server is located there, and has a contract with the owner of the server to market and
distribute his data (shareware) over the server, where the contract explicitly states that the legal relationship
created thereby is governed by the law of that forum. In CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, the Federal Court of
Appeals for the 6th Circuit held that the defendant, a Texas resident who marketed and distributed his
software via CompuServe's server in Ohio, could be subjected to personal jurisdiction in Ohio.[37] The Court
found the constitutionally requisite minimum contacts to the state, as the defendant "consciously reached out
from Texas to Ohio to subscribe to CompuServe, and to use its service to market his computer software on
the Internet, and he entered into a contract which expressly stated that it would be governed by and construed
in light of Ohio law."[38]
{20} 4. Personal jurisdiction does not exist in a trademark infringement case in which the defendant's
advertising site is accessible in the plaintiff's forum, but the likelihood that the site will produce any
commercial results in that forum is negligible (e.g., because the product advertised can be obtained and used
only in a location that is geographically remote from the plaintiff's forum).[39] The defendant in Bensusan
Restaurant Corp. v. King[40] was the owner of a night club called "The Blue Note" in Columbia, Missouri
and was sued for infringement by the owner of the "Blue Note" jazz club in New York City. The defendant
maintained a web site to promote his club, and the site was accessible to Net users around the world,
including those in New York. The court held that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant, as
the alleged infringement occurred in Missouri. Although the court's reasoning behind this conclusion is
anything but pellucid, the finding appears to be based on the idea that the defendant had no intention or
possibility to sell his product (i.e., tickets to shows in his club) in New York. The web site included a
telephone number for customers to order tickets, but any potential customer from New York would have had
to travel to Missouri to pick up the tickets and attend the show. This, the court apparently believed, was so
unlikely that the defendant's web site, although available around the world, was bound to create commercial
effects only within a small radius around Columbia, Missouri. Therefore, the court held that it did not have
personal jurisdiction under the New York long-arm statute. The court also found that jurisdiction was
improper under the Due Process Clause, as the defendant's creation of a web site, though felt in New York,
could not be seen as an act purposefully directed at New York.
{21} As this discussion shows, U.S. courts generally have been willing to exercise personal jurisdiction over
Net users only when the users have some contacts to the forum beyond the mere availability of the users' Net
transmissions, although some dicta in the Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry decision suggests a more
expansive jurisdictional stance might prove tempting to courts and prosecutors. It should be noted that the
cases upon which this analysis is based occurred primarily in the commercial context, and it remains
uncertain whether courts will be so restrained in their jurisdictional analyses in the criminal context.
Minnesota v. Granite Gate Resorts, one of the few Internet jurisdiction cases that involves criminal laws,
creates a frightening precedent under which Net users could incur criminal liability in every single
jurisdiction in which Net access exists.[41] This rule would lead to massive uncertainty and a likely chilling
effect on Net speech, as Net users would not be able to assess the probable legal effects of their participation
in Cyber-discourse and commerce. If these cases teach us anything, it is that interstate and international
agreements governing the issue of personal jurisdiction must be reached for the sake of legal certainty and the
further development of the Net.
 
B. The Role of Free Speech in Democratic Discourse -- Why Even Democracies Will Resist Unfettered
Net-Speech
{22} A basic argument of many advocates of Cyber-independence is that the Internet provides the most
unfettered, and therefore, most democratic forum in the world for the discussion of all issues under the sun.
This argument is based upon what I think is a faulty understanding of the role of speech restrictions in
democratic societies, as it presumes that democracies naturally should and will consider Net dialogue more
democratic the fewer restrictions placed on it. This idea is belied by the fact that every democracy in the
world imposes a myriad of restrictions on free speech, and that the particular restrictions vary considerably
from country to country. While it is true that a relatively open public discourse is the foundation of every
democracy, I believe the unique combination of restrictions on this discourse reveals the soul of a given
democracy. Therefore, countries will not adopt the view that an absolutely unfettered Internet deserves
protection because it is so democratic. Rather, countries will try to impose their existing speech restrictions
on the Net in order to preserve their own democracies. In the remainder of this paper, I will try to support this
view. To this end, I will discuss a basic difference between U.S. and German free speech law, namely, laws
relating to offensive and anti-semitic speech. This example will illustrate the extent to which laws differ
among democracies and the fact that these differences are perceived as central to each country's democracy.
Then, I will discuss the wide array of efforts currently underway to regulate the Net in order to support my
contention that regulation of Net speech is inevitable. I will conclude by arguing that the inevitability of such
regulation makes it essential that avid Net users put aside their opposition to any and all forms of Net
regulation and take an active and positive role in the development of effective and minimally restrictive
regulatory schemes and technologies.
1. The Illegal and the Merely Obnoxious -- Offensive Speech in the United States and Germany
{23} In this section, I will draw a general picture of the contours of free speech rights in America and
Germany as they relate to "offensive" speech, i.e., speech that is likely to offend the listener. Then, I will
focus on one particular type of offensive speech that would be constitutionally protected in the United States
but illegal in Germany. I will use the test case of a speaker who disseminates anti-semitic messages, in
particular, a denial that the Holocaust occurred. Through this test case, I intend to illustrate the variance in
free speech rules even between countries with similar political and legal systems and to discuss the
foundations of such variance.
a. Freedom of Speech in the United States: Offensive Speech and Fighting Words
{24} Any discussion of freedom of speech in America must begin with the broad language of the First
Amendment, which mandates that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press . . . ."[42] The Supreme Court has interpreted this broad mandate as a general prohibition against
content-based restrictions on speech, which the Court repeatedly has found to be presumptively
unconstitutional.[43] This does not mean, however, that all content-based restrictions are unconstitutional.
The most common examples of permissible content-based restrictions are laws against fraud, defamation,
obscenity and the like. But beyond these and a few other well-known and (with the possible exception of
obscenity laws) widely accepted laws, the Court has been very resistant to laws that restrict speech because of
its content.
i. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
{25} Perhaps the most controversial content-based restriction on speech that has passed constitutional muster
is the so-called fighting words doctrine, which allows for the criminalization of speech that is likely to cause
the average addressee to retaliate violently. The Court first upheld the constitutionality of such a law in 1942,
in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.[44] In that case, the defendant had been charged with violating New
Hampshire's law forbidding offensive, derisive, or annoying speech directed toward another person.[45] The
defendant, a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses, had been arrested for calling a police officer "a God damned
racketeer" and "a damned fascist".[46] The Court framed its analysis by stating that "[t]here are certain well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem".[47] The Court described those classes of speech as "the lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words--those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."[48] The Court upheld the law
under the state supreme court's narrow interpretation of the statute to outlaw only those "face-to-face words
plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee, words whose speaking constitutes a breach of
the peace by the speaker . . . ."[49]
{26} The Chaplinsky decision appears to create considerable room under the Constitution for laws forbidding
obnoxious or highly offensive speech. But the Court's jurisprudence in recent years has greatly limited the
permissibility of such laws. Indeed, a review of some recent decisions presents a strikingly different picture
of the range of permissible restrictions on offensive speech than Chaplinsky might lead one to expect.
{27} The heart of the Chaplinsky decision is the Court's emphasis on the effect of a speaker's words on the
addressee (or, more accurately, on a hypothetical, average addressee). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine what a
prohibition on fighting words would mean if the effect on the addressee were not decisive. But this very
principle has been undermined by subsequent case law, thus, in the words of one commentator, "eviscerating"
the doctrine recognized in Chaplinsky.[50]
ii. Texas v. Johnson
{28} In two recent cases, the Court struck down laws forbidding the burning of the American flag, holding in
one case that, while such an act may be offensive to the viewer, it does not constitute incitement to immediate
violence or fighting words and, therefore, cannot be restricted based upon the message expressed. In Texas v.
Johnson [51] the Court held that the defendant's burning of the flag was expressive conduct, which is entitled
to First Amendment protection as a form of speech.[52] The Court stated that, while the state has greater
leeway to restrict expressive conduct than verbal speech, the state's interest in doing so must be "unrelated to
the suppression of expression."[53]
{29} The statute at issue in Johnson forbade, inter alia, desecration of the American flag "in a way that the
actor knows will seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover his action."[54] The state
of Texas argued that the state interest served by this statute was the prevention of an act that would so greatly
offend viewers that they would be moved to disturb the peace.[55] The Court rejected the legitimacy of this
interest out of hand, stating that an expressive act may not be prohibited simply because it will cause such
serious offense that it will move viewers to breach the peace.[56] The Court forcefully defended the freedom
of speakers to make statements that are unpopular and will "'stir . . . people to anger.'"[57] The Court quoted
its decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio[58] relating to a rally by the Ku Klux Klan for the idea that offensive
expression may be prohibited only when it is "'directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action.'"[59]
{30} The Johnson Court thus seriously undermined the idea that offensive speech may be forbidden in order
to prevent breaches of the peace. The Court limited such prohibitions to speech that has not only the
likelihood, but also the purpose, of inciting unrest. This holding clearly shifts the focus of the inquiry from
the effect of the speech on the listener to the speaker's intent and is, therefore, a marked narrowing of the
Chaplinsky precedent.
{31} The Johnson Court likewise dismissed the state's argument that the defendant's burning of the flag could
be considered fighting words under Chaplinsky. The Court stated that "No reasonable onlooker would have
regarded Johnson's generalized expression of dissatisfaction with the policies of the Federal Government as a
direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs."[60] Again, the Court's ruling shifts the focus
from the listener to the speaker. It no longer is decisive, as it was in Chaplinsky, whether the words are
"plainly likely"[61] to cause the listener to retaliate with violence. Rather, the speaker must be directly
insulting the listener's person or "invit[ing him] to exchange fisticuffs."[62] Moreover, there appears to
remain no trace of the idea expressed in Chaplinsky that a fighting words law may prohibit speech that is
itself a breach of the peace in that it is so offensive as to inflict injury by its very utterance.
iii. United States v. Eichman
{32} The litigation in United States v. Eichman[63] was based upon several prosecutions under a revised
Federal Law forbidding flag burning passed in response to the Court's ruling in Johnson. The law forbade,
inter alia, knowingly burning the flag, with the exception of "any conduct consisting of the disposal of a flag
when it has become worn or soiled."[64] The government claimed that the law served its interest in
protecting the "physical integrity of the flag' . . . in order to safeguard the flag's identity 'as the unique and
unalloyed symbol of the Nation.'"[65]
{33} The government conceded, as in Johnson, that flag burning is expressive conduct, thus recognizing its
constitutionally protected status.[66] But the government claimed that the revised law, unlike the statute in
Johnson, passed constitutional muster, as it did not target expressive conduct on the basis of its message.[67]
The government's argument was, essentially, that the new law avoided the fatal flaw of the Texas statute by
eschewing any element that depended upon the effect of an act of flag burning on viewers. It therefore was
not, the government argued, in any way related to the actor's motives, his intended message or the message
perceived by onlookers.[68] But the Court rejected this contention outright, stating that "the Government's
asserted interest is 'related to the suppression of free expression' and concerned with the content of such
expression."[69] The Court based this finding on two grounds: (1) the law's aim to preserve the symbolic
value of the flag betrays an interest in the message conveyed by the destruction of a particular manifestation
of the symbol, as the burning of one particular flag does not affect the symbol itself in any way; (2) the law's
language ("mutilates," "defaces," "defiles," etc.) connotes a focus on disrespectful treatment of the flag and its
meaning for the flag's symbolic value, and the exception for disposal of worn flags makes clear that only
destruction of the flag with a particular mindset is to be punished.[70] The Court concluded that the new
Federal law suffered from the same constitutional flaw as the Texas law, namely, that it "suppresse[d]
expression out of concern for its likely communicative impact."[71]
{34} Given its finding that the law was related to the suppression of expression, the Court subjected the
government's stated interest to the highest level of constitutional scrutiny.[72] The Court held that the law did
not pass constitutional muster, as the government's interest did not justify the intrusion on First Amendment
rights.[73] The Court rejected the government's argument that the law should be given special consideration
because there existed a "national consensus" in favor of a ban on flag burning, holding that a law suppressing
speech may not be viewed more favorably simply because of popular opposition to that speech.[74] The
Court concluded by comparing flag burning to "virulent ethnic and racial epithets," "vulgar repudiations of
the draft" and "scurrilous caricatures" to emphasize the principle that the government "'may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.'"[75] Although
Eichman was not decided based on the fighting words doctrine, the Court's ruling once again limited the
extent to which the effect of potentially offensive speech on listeners may justify restrictions on such speech.
iv. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota
{35} The Court continued its resistence to restrictions on offensive speech in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,[76] in
which it overturned a law[77] prohibiting, inter alia, burning crosses or displaying the Nazi swastika or other
symbols that arouse anger, alarm or resentment in others based on race, religion, or other factors. The Court
declared that it was bound by the state supreme court's finding that the statute prohibited only fighting words
within the meaning of Chaplinsky; thus, the Court considered whether prohibiting fighting words was
unconstitutional under Chaplinsky.[78] The Court quoted Chaplinsky for the idea that certain speech may be
restricted because the slight social value of its content is outweighed by the "social interest in order and
morality." The Court noted, however, that those categories of speech are not "entirely invisible to the
Constitution."[79] Thus, fighting words, as a category, may be restricted under the Constitution; however, a
law that prohibits only fighting words with a certain content would be unconstitutional, unless "the basis for
the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is
proscribable."[80] This means that an obscenity law could proscribe only that obscenity that appeals in the
strongest way to the prurient interest, but a libel law could not make punishable only that libelous speech that
is critical of the government. Based on this principle, which appears to be a new creature in the menagerie of
First Amendment jurisprudence, the Court held that the St. Paul ordinance was facially unconstitutional, as it
proscribed only those fighting words that offend or provoke violence "on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender."[81]
{36} As in the flag burning cases discussed above, the R.A.V. ruling reflects the Court's recent resistance to
speech restrictions that emphasize the effect of speech on listeners.[82] It is important to bear in mind that the
ordinance at issue in R.A.V. did not prohibit fighting words that were motivated by racial or other bias; rather,
it proscribed fighting words that would be likely to offend the listener based on their racist or other biased
content. Since the flag burning cases and R.A.V., it is difficult to determine what remains of the fighting words
doctrine established in Chaplinsky. That doctrine now seems to stand only for the narrow proposition that
speech that amounts to direct incitement to immediate breaches of the peace may be proscribed, albeit
without any distinction related to the basis of the speech's offensiveness.
v. Applying U.S. Law to the Test Case: The Permissibility of Anti-semitic Speech
{37} First, a statement of the test case: a U.S. citizen sitting before her computer in Carbondale, Illinois
creates a web site containing messages of extreme anti-semitic content, including allegations of a world-wide
Jewish conspiracy, a "revisionist" history of World War II refuting the occurrence of the Holocaust and a
crude swastika formed by repeatedly typing the letter K to form the shape of that symbol of Nazism. The
user's site is accessible throughout the world via the Net, and its contents are not censored in any way by her
access provider.
{38} Based upon the Supreme Court's recent First Amendment jurisprudence relating to offensive speech, it
seems clear that this user's messages could not be proscribed based upon their content. The speech, although
exceedingly repugnant, informed by racism and clear falsehoods, and certain to offend virtually every
potential reader, does not fit within the narrow confines of the fighting words doctrine. It does not amount to
incitement to an immediate breach of the peace, and it, therefore, cannot be proscribed based on its content.
As to the denial of the Holocaust, U.S. law simply does not contemplate, and the Constitution would not
permit, restrictions on the expression of untrue factual allegations in this context. For better or for worse,
people in the United States are free to deny the Holocaust, insist that John F. Kennedy was murdered by the
Central Intelligence Agency or claim that blacks are genetically destined to possess lower intelligence than
whites.
{39} The reasons cited by courts and commentators to justify broad constitutional protection of such
apparently valueless statements generally are based upon the idea that the best way to pursue truth and justice
within the American version of democracy is to have as few restraints on the marketplace of ideas as
possible. The most famous statement of the function of free speech within American democracy comes from
Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in Whitney v. California[83] and reads as follows:
To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning
applied through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be
deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it
may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through
discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy
to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.[84]
{40} The Court in Texas v. Johnson quoted Brandeis' formulation and asserted that its rejection of the flag
burning prohibition at issue represented "a reaffirmation of the principles of freedom and inclusiveness that
the flag best reflects, and of the conviction that our toleration of criticism such as Johnson's is a sign and
source of our strength."[85] The Court concluded that it could "imagine no more appropriate response to
burning a flag than waving one's own, no better way to counter a flag burner's message than by saluting the
flag that burns. . . ."[86]
{41} Commentators have found various other ways to describe the principles that underlie First Amendment
law. Donald Alexander Downs argues that the "content neutrality rule"--the general prohibition on content-
based speech laws -- "reflects the logic of 'procedural justice,'" which stresses equal access to political
processes for all groups within society, including those with unpopular views.[87] Mari J. Matsuda has
summarized existing First Amendment law, as follows: "[U]nder our system, there is 'no such thing as a false
idea.' All ideas deserve a public forum, and the way to combat anti-democratic ideas is through counter-
expression. When all ideas are voiced freely, we have the greatest chance of obtaining the right results."[88]
Furthermore, Owen Fiss identifies the underlying logic of protecting free speech as "collective self-
determination," in which people ". . . choose the form of life they wish to live and which presupposes that this
choice is made against a background of wide-open public debate. . . ."[89]
{42} The Court's and the commentators' explanations of the purpose of American judicial resistance to
content-based limitations on speech reveal an almost unlimited faith in the power of an unfettered public
discourse to correct falsehoods.[90] The idea that lies, even vicious racist lies, are best dealt with by allowing
other speakers to reveal such lies for what they are is in sharp contrast to the German position. The following
section will discuss German free speech jurisprudence with a focus on regulation of offensive speech and
outright lies.
b. Free Speech in Germany: Untrue Speech and Protected Rights
{43} German constitutional law relating to freedom of expression differs in two fundamental ways from
American free speech law. First, Article 5 of the German Basic Law does not establish a right to freedom of
speech; rather, it permits freedom to express one's opinion.[91] Second, the Basic Law itself names two state
interests upon which limitations on the freedom of expression can be based: the protection of minors and the
protection of personal honor.[92] Both of these distinctions from American law are more than mere formal or
linguistic differences. Both differences affect the contours of German freedom of expression in substantial
ways. The first distinction means that certain speech lies outside of the Basic Law's protective field and,
therefore, can be proscribed without raising constitutional concerns. The second distinction means that the
Basic Law itself prescribes certain state interests that may take precendence over the right to freedom of
expression. Thus, speech can be restricted under German law either because it lies completely outside of the
Basic Law or because it implicates one of the interests privileged by the Basic Law itself.
i. Speech Beyond the Basic Law: Distinguishing Fact From Opinion
{44} The difference between Article 5's protection of the right to express one's opinion and the right to
freedom of speech in the U.S. Constitution is striking. The U.S. Constitution protects essentially all types of
speech and any restriction must be justified by a sufficient state interest.[93] In contrast, the German Basic
Law does not offer blanket protection to all speech. Rather, certain speech -- namely, factual statements that
are evidently or known to be untrue -- may be proscribed without implicating the Basic Law in any way.[94]
{45} The Federal Constitutional Court has expressed the reasoning behind this principle as follows:
It is the purpose of expressions of opinion to convey an intellectual effect on one's surroundings
and to convince others and contribute to the formation of opinion. Value judgments are
accordingly protected without its depending upon whether the expression is valuable or
worthless, true or false, emotional or rational. Factual claims also are protected by the
fundamental right to express an opinion to the extent that they are the basis for the formation of
opinions. Only a consciously untrue factual claim falls outside the zone of protection of the
fundamental right, as it cannot contribute to the constitutionally contemplated formation of
opinion.[95]
{46} The exclusion of untrue factual claims from constitutional protection reveals the German court's belief
that certain speech, even if it does not implicate other protected rights, can be removed from democratic
discourse without damaging the quality of that process. Indeed, the court seems to believe that removing such
speech will improve the discourse, as it reduces the risk that a listener will be misled by false factual claims.
Dieter Grimm, a judge on the Federal Constitutional Court, explains that expressions of opinion do not
present this same risk of being misleading because listeners can identify them as subjective statements and
can distance themselves from them, whereas factual claims bear the guise of objectivity and do not appear to
be tied to the subjective speaker.[96] This conception of shielding public discourse from counterproductive
speech is in contrast with the American view that no speech should be excluded unless it harms other state
interests. Whereas the American solution to false speech is "more speech" in order to educate the original
speaker and other listeners, the German answer is that such speech endangers the process and that its
proscription actually improves the discourse.
ii. Permissible Prohibitions on Constitutionally Protected Speech
aa. Abusive Speech -- the "Schmähkritik" Doctrine
{47} As the preceeding discussion shows, the Basic Law protects true factual statements and all statements of
opinion unless they implicate another protected right that deserves to be given precedence over the freedom
of expression. This "weighing of rights" idea was first enunciated by the Federal Constitutional Court in the
famous Lüth decision from 1958.[97] The Lüth court called the principle a "weighing of rights," because
one's freedom of expression must yield when another person's protected interests of a higher priority would
be harmed by such expression.[98] The Court did not specify which protected interests or rights would justify
such restrictions on expression, but the starting point for such an analysis in the Court's subsequent
jurisprudence has been the language of the Basic Law.
{48} As stated above, Article 5 of the Basic Law contemplates the restriction of the freedom of expression
for the protection of minors or personal honor.[99] The latter consideration, protection of personal honor,
presents the clearest contrast to U.S. constitutional law regarding freedom of expression. Constitutional Judge
Grimm has written that U.S. law differs most essentially from German constitutional law in that German law
does not presume that freedom of expression enjoys a privileged position vis a vis other protected rights.[100]
In the balancing process, the right to freedom of expression is viewed by German courts as equally important,
not more important, than such other rights as the protection of personal honor.[101]
{49} Although the equal status of protected rights requires German courts to approach the collision of rights
in a case-by-case manner, certain general principles have been established in the case law of the
Constitutional Court to deal with conflicting rights.[102] In general, freedom of expression must yield when
the expression would impugn human dignity, the value underlying all other fundamental rights.[103] In
addition, the right to personal honor enjoys general priority over freedom of expression when the expression
takes the form of a "formal insult" or "Schmähkritik," which can be translated as abusive speech.[104]
Proscribable abusive speech is narrowly defined as that which is intended not to address a topic of debate, but
to attack a person himself.[105] An example of such speech was presented in the case of a literary critic who,
in a magazine review of a new edition of deceased author Heinrich Böll's works, called Böll "dumb as a
rock," "talentless," "fake, even corrupt," and "an in part pathological, in part harmless idiot" and derided his
works as "often repulsive crap."[106] The Court held that the reviewer's words were abusive of Böll's person,
and that they could be sanctioned, as they did not appear in the context of a content-based or aesthetic
treatment of Böll's works. Rather, the Court, in applying the Schmähkritik doctrine, found the reviewer's
words "stand [only] for themselves and exhaust themselves in their abuse of Böll's person, and that they
could be sanctioned, as they did not appear in the content."[107]
{50} "Schmähkritik" has become one of the most volatile battlegrounds for commentators advocating
different balancing acts between the competing rights of free expression and personal honor. Much of the
debate has focused on the Federal Constitutional Court's rulings in four cases in which the defendants were
accused of harming individual soldiers' personal honor by displaying in varying forms a quote from the writer
Kurt Tucholsky to the effect that "soldiers are murderers."[108] The Court indicated that it understood these
statements to be expressions of the ideas that war in general is bad and that conscientious objection should be
encouraged.[109] However, the Court declined to rule definitively on the defendants' liability, remanding the
cases for the lower courts to reconsider the various possible meanings of the statements other than a purely
abusive one.[110]
{51} The ruling in the soldiers' honor case and two related rulings from the early 1990s[111] have inspired a
steady stream of critical commentary from both advocates of greater freedom of expression and of increased
protection of personal honor.[112]
{52} The "Schmähkritik" doctrine, although it has been fairly narrowly construed by the German Court in
recent years, illustrates that German law permits somewhat greater restrictions on offensive speech than the
"eviscerated" fighting words doctrine in U.S. law. However, an even more telling distinction between U.S.
and German free expression law is presented in another type of speech found by the German Court to be
proscribable because it implicates personal honor, namely, denials of the Holocaust.
bb. Forbidden Lies -- Prohibition of Holocaust Denials
{53} The body of law regarding the restriction of speech that may implicate the personal honor of another
person gained a new limb in 1994 when the German legislature passed a law forbidding speech denying that
the Holocaust occurred. The law, which took the form of an amendment to section 130 of the Criminal Code,
provides for imprisonment for up to five years for anyone who "publicly or before a gathering endorses,
denies or portrays as harmless an act [of genocide] committed under the rule of National Socialism in such a
way that is suited to cause a breach of the peace."[113] It should be noted that much anti-semitic speech and
certain denials of the Holocaust were punishable under the German Criminal Code before the passage of this
amendment in 1994; the amendment's main innovation was to criminalize the so-called "simple Auschwitz
Lie" in which the speaker's denial of the Holocaust is not stated as part of a larger opinion or theory (but note
that section 130 also covers Holocaust denials that are couched in broader historical views and that go
beyond simple factual statements).[114]
{54} Although the requirement that the speech be "suited to cause a breach of the peace" might appear to
place a significant limitation on the law and make it similar to U.S. laws forbidding incitement to direct
breaches of the peace, this requirement is actually far lighter than it seems; it means only that the speech
potentially could cause a breach of peace, not that it concretely endangers the public peace in reality.[115]
This is an important distinction for a comparative look at German and American free speech law, as this
means the 1994 law almost certainly would be found unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court under the
flag burning cases and R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.[116]
{55} The law forbidding the Auschwitz Lie finds its constitutional grounding in two basic principles of the
German Basic Law. First, the Auschwitz Lie is viewed as a false factual statement and, therefore, not
protected by Article 5 of the Basic Law.[117] This idea applies only to the simple Auschwitz Lie, as a denial
of the Holocaust that is embedded in a more complex historical or even purely racist argument likely would
be viewed as a mixture of factual allegation and opinion and, therefore, would enjoy the protection of Article
5. Second, the law has been found to protect the personal honor of Jews still living in Germany, which places
it within one of the constitutionally recognized categories of permissible limitations on freedom of
expression.[118] Both foundations are important, as the simple Auschwitz Lie can be barred as a false factual
statement, but a Holocaust denial presented in the context of an opinion must be found to implicate some
other protected right in order to permit its proscription under Article 5 jurisprudence.
{56} The Constitutional Court upheld the 1994 law under both of these propositions, first restating the
familiar proposition that false factual statements do not enjoy constitutional protection.[119] The Court then
pointed out that it can be difficult to distinguish purely factual statements from expressions of opinion, which
finding required an analysis of the law as a restriction on protected expressions of opinion.[120] The Court
held that the law is constitutional as a restriction on protected speech, as it protects the personal honor of
Jews currently living in Germany, stating that "Jews living in Germany, because of the fate to which the
Jewish population was subjected under the rule of National Socialism, constitute a group that is vulnerable to
insult; the denial of the persecution of Jews is found to be an insult to this group."[121] The Court's decision,
however, has been controversial, as commentators have pointed out that the 1994 law, based on its legislative
history and plain language, is not intended to protect the personal honor of anyone; rather, they argue, its
purpose is to protect the public peace.[122] The Court's purpose in basing its ruling on personal honor and
not public peace may have been to give the law a more unassailable constitutional pedigree, as personal
honor (stated in Art. 5 as a basis for restricting free expression) seems to bear greater constitutional weight
than public peace in a balancing test vis a vis freedom of expression.
{57} The law and the Court's decision upholding it have come under fire from commentators who oppose the
law on both constitutional and political grounds.[123] One particularly sharp critique by Daniel Beisel argued
that the prohibition of Holocaust denials comes very close to a state-mandated prohibition on thought.[124]
Moreover, Beisel argued that the law is a bad idea in political terms, as "the prohibition of any discussion of
the events that occurred in Auschwitz can readily lead over a longer period of time to a complete questioning
of the truth of the Nazi genocide, as it is not permissible to debate this issue publicly and this questioning of
the truth can ferment out of sight."[125] Beisel asserted that "[i]n a free democracy, it must also be possible to
express provably false opinions" and questioned why it is not illegal to deny other instances of genocide.
[126] In my view, this very question reveals the key to understanding the 1994 law, namely, that it is
intimately related to Germany's unique role in 20th-century history.
{58} I believe this law represents an outlier within Germany's constitutional law, undertaken by the
legislature and endorsed by the Constitutional Court for the purpose of showing an enduring awareness and
preventing a recurrence of Germany's horrific past. No other false historical claim that I know of is
specifically forbidden by federal law. So, for example, a German citizen could deny without violating the law
that slavery ever occurred in the United States or that Stalin had millions of people murdered in the Soviet
Union. But the law does not merely distinguish between false claims based upon geography. A German
citizen could just as well deny that Germany had any role in World War I or deny that any East Germans were
shot by border guards during escape attempts before the fall of the Berlin Wall.[127] The fact that the
Bundestag chose to forbid only this particular historical lie, and that the Constitutional Court has provided the
law with such a formidable constitutional foundation indicate that the law reflects very deeply held beliefs in
German society (assuming, as I do, that the democratic process in Germany functions well).
{59} I believe this law is an excellent example of the fact that speech regimes do not differ for random or
unimportant reasons, but for reasons that relate directly to the defining values of a given nation. It is,
therefore, precisely in the differences among nations' free speech laws that each nation's unique central
beliefs are reflected, which means that nations generally will be exceedingly resistent to any influence that
threatens to iron out the intentional wrinkles in their speech regimes. The Internet, in its current, largely
unregulated form, poses just this threat. For example, neo-Nazi speech, including Holocaust denials, now can
be freely accessed by any Net-user in Germany.[128] It is, therefore, no surprise that many countries around
the world, including Germany, are attempting to find ways to apply their current speech regimes to Net-
speech. This process, I believe, is inevitable, and the extensive governmental efforts currently underway to
regulate the Net affirm this belief. In the following section, I will give an overview of some such efforts in
Germany and the European Union.[129]
 
C. Muzzling the Net -- The Inevitable Move Toward Regulation
1. German Regulation
{60} The activities of a wide range of German authorities in the last three years have left little doubt that
Germany intends to apply its existing speech restrictions to the Internet. Prosecutors have investigated and
filed criminal charges against Net users for transmitting or providing access to content that is illegal under
German law. Politicians have called for the development of federal and international regulatory schemes to
regulate illegal content on the Net. In addition, the federal legislature is considering legislative initiatives to
bring the Net under the umbrella of existing law and to create Net-specific laws. This broad spectrum of
activity suggests that the German government is determined to regulate Net content that violates existing
limits on freedom of expression.
a. Prosecutional Activity
{61} The first major attempt by German authorities to apply existing content laws to the Net arose in the
context of child pornography. In late 1995, the Office of the District Attorney for Munich launched an
investigation into the German subsidiary of CompuServe, based on a suspicion that the company had violated
laws forbidding the distribution of child pornography.[130] The prosecutors searched CompuServe's Munich
offices, including some electronically stored data.[131] At the prosecutors' urging, the company shut down
access world wide to some 200 newsgroups that the German authorities identified to CompuServe as
containing content in violation of German law.[132] CompuServe later found a more limited, technological
solution in which the company denied its customers in Germany access to the newsgroups.[133] More
recently, Bavaria set up a commission for the prevention of criminal activity over the Net.[134]
{62} Prosecutors have not limited their attention to access providers, but recently have targeted Net users as
well. Bavaria, which is known as a politically conservative state, has not been the only locus of prosecutorial
activities relating to Net content. For example, in early February 1997, a 23-year-old student in Bonn was
charged by the local district attorney with abetting criminal activities by allegedly loading a "terrorist
handbook" onto the Net via an American server.[135]
{63} In addition, in the most controversial prosecution relating to the Net in Germany, Angela Marquardt, a
former leader and current member of the Party of Democratic Socialism, has been charged with, inter alia,
abetting the direction of a criminal act by providing a link on her homepage to a Dutch online magazine that
contained allegedly illegal information.[136] Marquardt was acquitted in June of 1997 of some charges but
on November 14, 1997 was ordered to pay a fine of 1000 marks for distributing reports about an ongoing
judicial proceeding over the internet.[137] The Dutch magazine, "radikal", contained an article called "A
Small Guide to the Hinderance of All Types of Train Transports," which dealt with plans to sabotage German
railways as a means to hinder the rail transportation of radioactive material.[138] Marquardt's homepage
included a short text that she had written in opposition to violence in political activism and that called for a
dialogue on militancy.[139] Her page was shut down at the demand of the Federal State's Attorney's Office,
and the entire server that provided access to "radikal" also was closed. This shut off access not only to
"radikal" but to thousands of other homepages as well.[140]
{64} The Marquardt case illustrates two important points about current efforts to regulate the Net. First, the
will to regulate is very strong, and authorities are prepared to pursue not only access providers, but also users
for providing access to illegal content. Second, the authorities' methods and current laws are inadequate to
effectively close off access to illegal content. Despite the fact that CompuServe shut down Marquardt's
homepage at the request of German authorities, the page quickly became available again with the same links
via a different service provider.[141] And access to "radikal" by Net users around the world (including in
Germany), if anything, has expanded greatly since the site was supposedly closed off to German users. The
"radikal" homepage is now accessible via more than 50 servers around the world.[142] Given the clear will of
German authorities to apply existing laws to the Internet, one can imagine that cases such as this will only
lead to more urgent calls for effective mechanisms of regulating Net content.
b. Political Activity
{65} With one notable exception, federal politicians have been consistent in their public stance that illegal
and harmful content on the Internet must be regulated through national legal reform and international
agreements. The one exception is Justice Minister Edzard Schmidt-Jortzig, a member of the liberal Free
Democratic Party, who has spoken out against efforts by the German government to regulate Net content.
Schmidt-Jortzig said in an interview with the news magazine "Der Spiegel" that he wishes "we could get
away without regulation based on the responsible actions of users."[143] The Minister recognized that the
German state has legitimate interests to protect its citizens through such regulation, but argued that legislation
limited to one country is bound to fail, because the Net "knows no borders."[144] He concluded that "for
better or for worse, we must take leave of the idea that we can enforce German laws on the Internet."[145]
{66} Schmidt-Jortzig's ideas, however, appear to be well outside of the mainstream of German political
thought. The most well-publicized statement in favor of Net regulation came from Family Minister Claudia
Nolte, who called for the United Nations to aid in the development of international standards in order to
prevent the dissemination of child pornography and neo-Nazi propaganda via the Net.[146] Nolte stated that,
"because the Internet knows no national borders, we will be able to protect youth only through international
standards."[147] Nolte was calling for international standards, because she said such standards are necessary
to enforce laws that are specifically German, such as laws against neo-Nazi speech. This apparently means
that she wants a unified international free speech standard created by international enforcement agreements,
but without a dilution of Germany's speech restrictions.
{67} The administration of Chancellor Helmut Kohl seems to agree with Nolte's approach, as it has called for
a European Union-wide conference to discuss ways of controlling offensive content on the Net.[148] In
addition, the Children's Council of the Bundestag and its chairman, Johannes Singhammer, have called for
tougher regulations regarding Net content that could be harmful to children.[149]
{68} The notion that the German government fully intends to apply existing speech restrictions to the Net
finds further support in a lengthy statement by the Federal Minister for Education, Science, Research and
Technology, Jürgen Rüttgers. In the statement, Rüttgers addressed the legal framework for the legislative
initiatives discussed below. He stated that "[t]he Federal Government will not tolerate the misuse of the
global information highway for the dissemination of illegal content such as child pornography and
extremism. National action is necessary, but it is not enough."[150] He proposed changes to the Criminal
Code to include the Net within its scope, international agreements (through the G-7), a clarification of who
can be held responsible for illegal content, and voluntary self-regulation to the extent that it can be effective,
noting that the state should step in only when self-regulation fails.[151]
c. Legislative Activity
{69} Several legislative initiatives have been undertaken to create rules specific to the Internet and to codify
existing laws to ensure their applicbility to the Net. The Bundestag (lower house of parliament) passed a law
on July 22, 1997 called the Information and Communications Services Act, which holds Internet access and
service providers liable for illegal content in two situations: (1) when the access or service provider is the
source of the content; or (2) when the provider is not the source of the content but knows that the content is
available through its service, and it is technologically feasible through reasonable efforts to restrict access to
the content.[152] The law which was approved by the Bundesrat (upper house) on July 4, 1997 and which
took effect on August 1, 1997, releases providers from liability for illegal content if the provider is not its
source and is unaware of its existence.[153] The Act clearly presupposes that existing German speech
restrictions apply to the Net and are to be enforced when possible. This presupposition becomes clearer in a
later article of the law, which amends the Criminal Code and two civil laws relating to, inter alia, the
dissemination of words that could be harmful to youth.[154] The changes to those laws insert language
making it clear that the laws' existing provisions apply to the Internet.[155]
{70} The second major German legislative initiative is a so-called "State Treaty" among all 16 Federal States
of Germany, which creates unified Internet regulations in all of the states.[156] This agreement, which was
signed by the states in January and February of 1997 and took effect on August 1, 1997, includes the identical
rules governing the legal liability of service and access providers as the Federal Information and
Communications Services Act discussed above.[157] Similarly, the state agreement explicitly apllies existing
limits on free speech to the Internet, including laws for the protection of personal honor.[158] It specifically
restates some of the provisions of the law against racist speech (i.e. &sect; 130 of the Criminal Code,
previously discussed in this paper) and proscribes Internet content that promotes hatred of racial or ethnic
groups or portrays as harmless gruesome acts against such groups.[159] Finally, the agreement permits
individual states to forbid illegal content on the Net and to order that access to such content be terminated.
[160] This "State Treaty" and the federal law discussed above demonstrate the clear determination of the
federal and state governments in Germany to apply existing speech restrictions to the Net, including those
restrictions that are unique to Germany.
2. European Union Regulatory Initiatives
{71} The European Union (E.U.) has produced a wealth of reports and studies relating to the regulation of
illegal content on the Internet, but it has yet to take any action.[161] The European Parliament recently hired
a British engineering firm to conduct a six-month study of the feasibility of using technological mechanisms
to regulate pornographic and racist materials on the Net. In a 1996 report, the European Commission
discussed ongoing initiatives at the national level throughout the E.U. and concluded that the authority to
prosecute and punish people responsible for illegal Net content should remain with the member states.[162]
While the Commission supported self-regulation, including a code of conduct for service providers, it
emphasized that national laws still apply to the Net and that self-regulation does not excuse Net users and
service providers from prosecution for violations of existing laws.[163] Finally, the Commission endorsed the
idea of international agreements allowing cooperation among police and judicial systems beyond the borders
of the E.U.[164] This idea found additional support among the telecommunications ministers of the E.U.
member states, who called for international cooperation through the World Trade Organization and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.[165]
{72} The ideas expressed in these reports were echoed in another report from late 1996, which called for
international agreements, a clarification of responsibility for illegal content and limited self-regulation.[166]
This report stressed that national laws do apply to the Net and asserted that the Net "does not exist in a legal
vacuum."[167] In addition, this report addressed the difficulty of enforcing laws in the Internet context and
called for an agreement among all service providers around the world to remove content that a government
decides is illegal in its country.[168] If this idea seems implausible, the report suggested, "an alternative
might be to block access at the level of access providers."[169]
{73} Yet another study on this topic, called a "Green Paper", was written by the European Commission in late
1996. In this study, the Commission called for an E.U.-wide definition of what content should be considered
illegal on the Net and for expanded police and judicial cooperation and emphasized international approaches
to illegal Net content.[170] Like most of the other reports discussed here, the Green Paper endorsed the PICS
labeling standards and the use of filtering systems to control illegal content.[171]
{74} In a resolution passed on February 17, 1997, the European Council noted the contents of these reports in
calling for self-regulation, the continued development of filtering mechanisms and rating of sites, and more
study of the question of legal liability for Net content.[172] Given the wealth of information that has been
gathered by the E.U.'s various bodies, it is apparent that the E.U. takes seriously the issue of Internet
regulation. Its work up until this time has shown a recognition of the intention of member states to apply their
own speech laws to Net content, and one can expect any E.U. regulatory effort to preserve the differences
among member states' speech regimes.
 
IV. Conclusion
{75} The Internet represents an unparalleled forum for locating information, establishing contact with people
from around the world and engaging in discussion of virtually any topic imaginable. However, its very
openness also means it presents unequalled opportunities for the dissemination of speech which would be
outlawed by various countries were it to be expressed by means of a different medium. As an American, I
believe in the idea that the best antidote for poisonous hate speech is more speech. But I am less convinced
that this maxim applies with equal force to other societies. The German example is telling. A law forbidding
the Auschwitz Lie would fail constitutional challenge in the United States because we believe our democratic
discourse functions best without prohibitions on such historical lies. But such a law has passed constitutional
muster in Germany because much of German society believes public discourse in that country is improved by
the prohibition of that particular lie.
{76} The example may be obvious, but I propose it reveals that democracies do not necessarily view an
unregulated Internet as a more democratic institution than a Net with particular speech restrictions. Rather,
democratic societies are almost certain to impose their existing speech regimes on the Net precisely because
they believe such restrictions will ensure the Net's positive role in their democracies. The myriad regulatory
efforts currently underway support this contention. Given the inevitability of Net regulation, I think Net users
in every country, despite their wish that the Net could remain in its current, largely unregulated state, should
take a leading role in guiding regulation. These users know far more about the positive aspects of the Net
than an average member of the U.S. Congress or the German Bundestag, and they are the segment of society
that will be most directly affected by future regulation. Net users have both the knowledge and the incentive
to help their governments find the most effective, yet least restrictive, regulatory scheme possible. If the
thought of any regulation of the Net causes users to shudder, the idea that laws will be written by Net-
ignorant legislators without the benefit of those users' experience and knowledge should give them
nightmares.
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